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Abstract:  
Despite a large literature documenting that the efficacy of monetary policy depends on how 
inflation expectations are anchored, many monetary policy models assume: (1) the inflation 
target of monetary policy is constant; and, (2) the inflation target is known by all economic 
agents. This paper proposes an empirical specification with two policy shocks: permanent 
changes to the inflation target and transitory perturbations of the short-term real rate. The 
public sector cannot correctly distinguish between these two shocks and, under incomplete 
learning, private perceptions of the inflation target will not equal the true target. The paper 
shows how imperfect policy credibility can affect economic responses to structural shocks, 
including transition to a new inflation target – a question that cannot be addressed by many 
commonly used empirical and theoretical models. In contrast to models where all monetary 
policy actions are transient, the proposed specification implies that sizable movements in 
historical bond yields and inflation are attributable to perceptions of permanent shocks in 
target inflation. 
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 1 Introduction
Many models that are used to evaluate monetary policy assume, either explicitly or
implicitly, that (1) the inﬂation target of monetary policy is constant over the period
being analyzed; and, (2) the inﬂation target is known by all economic agents. Because
the actual and perceived inﬂation targets are equal and ﬁxed, long-horizon expectations
are independent of short-run policy in such models.1 Consequently, all monetary policy
actions are transient, and monetary policy appears to contribute only modestly to postwar
ﬂuctuations in bond rates and economic activity.
The assumption that the inﬂation target is fully credible is surprisingly prevalent in
recent studies that examine historical policy or evaluate alternative policies. The literature
that evaluates policy alternatives under a constant and credible inﬂation target is vast.
Optimizing models used to evaluate alternative monetary policies, such as those reviewed in
Taylor (1999), generally assume a constant inﬂation target is common knowledge. Likewise,
standard atheoretical empirical analyses of policy eﬀects implicitly assume a ﬁxed policy
target or stationary nominal anchor. As noted by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a), VARs
containing the levels of inﬂation and nominal interest rates imply constant and known
natural rates for those variables.
The traditional assumption that policy objectives were known to the private sector
w a sa c c o m p a n i e di ne a r l ys t u d i e sb ya ne m p h a s i so nt h er e a le ﬀects of unanticipated
changes in monetary policy, such as Lucas (1973) and Sargent and Wallace (1976). Because
imperfectly observed policy is equivalent to unanticipated policy, several early studies
noted that monetary policy could have larger real eﬀects in learning or ﬁltering transitions
between persistent shifts in policy, such as Taylor (1980), Meyer and Webster (1982), and
1The conclusion that long-run expectations are independent of short-run policy presumes that the policy
being followed is consistent with the goals of policy. For example, a Taylor-type (1993) interest rate rule
with an explicit numerical inﬂation target that doesnt satisfy the Taylor principle would generally lead to
explosive inﬂation and explosive private-sector inﬂation forecasts. Such a policy rule would be inconsistent
with the inﬂation target.
1Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). In subsequent literature, the introduction of nominal
frictions permitted real eﬀects of expected monetary policy. By contrast with earlier
emphasis on the strength of unanticipated policy under learning, more recent papers indicate
that expected policy eﬀects can be signiﬁcantly attenuated if private agents are not instantly
aware of shifts in policy targets, such as the lengthy learning lags estimated in Kozicki and
Tinsley (2001a, 2001b).
Accounting for imperfect policy credibility and learning is particularly important in the
context of the nonstationary behavior of postwar U.S. inﬂation. Regime-switching models
ﬁtt oU . S .i n ﬂation include, Brunner (1991), Evans and Wachtel (1993), Evans and Lewis
(1995), and Garcia and Perron (1996). Levin and Piger (2003) present evidence for a
one-time break in the mean inﬂation rates of twelve industrial countries, including the U.S.,
over a 1984-2002 sample. Relaxing the assumption of a ﬁx e dn u m b e ro fr e g i m e sa n du s i n g
samples from the 1960s through the 1990s, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b, and 2002)
provide empirical evidence on nonstationary movements in the mean of inﬂation and suggest
these reﬂect shifts in private agent perceptions of the policy target for inﬂation.
Of course, evidence of mean shifts in the inﬂation process may be consistent with an
unknown, but ﬁxed, inﬂation target and time-varying perceptions. For example, Orphanides
and Williams (2003) illustrate that the perceived inﬂation target estimated by learning
agents may increase in response to unfavorable inﬂation shocks, even if the true target is
invariant. The divergence of perceived and actual inﬂation targets is larger for policies
that place more emphasis on real output stability, providing one interpretation of high
and rising levels of inﬂation in the 1970s. An alternative historical interpretation includes
t h ep r o s p e c tt h a tt h ee ﬀective inﬂation target drifted higher in the 1970s, in part due to
partial accommodation of sizeable supply shocks, followed in the 1980s by rapid reductions
in the true policy target but much slower declines in the perceived inﬂation target. While
the latter view is more consistent with econometric speciﬁc a t i o n su s e di nt h i sp a p e r ,b o t h
2interpretations share the common assumptions of asymmetric policy information and of
signiﬁcant deviations of private sector long-run inﬂation forecasts from the true inﬂation
target.
Because shifts in the perceived inﬂation target do not always appear to coincide with
possible shifts in the inﬂation target of the monetary authority, asymmetric information on
the part of private sector agents and the monetary authority seems more plausible than the
standard assumption of full information. In this paper, such deviations of the perceived
target from the true target provide evidence of imperfect policy credibility, where credible
policy is deﬁned as the equivalence of the natural rate of private sector inﬂation forecasts
with the inﬂation target of the monetary authority.
Recent macro models with shifting policy regimes include the atheoretic empirical model
of Cogley and Sargent (2003), the calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
of Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), and Bayesian estimates of
the DSGE models in Schorfheide (2003). Similar to learning speciﬁcations in the last two
citations, private agent learning in the current paper is based on agent responses to the
prediction error of the short-term interest rate controlled by monetary policy.
This paper reexamines evidence on the monetary transmission mechanism using a small
empirical model of the U.S. economy. The model speciﬁcation admits imperfect policy
credibility by relaxing the standard assumptions of full information and a constant inﬂation
target. Monetary policy is summarized by a policy rule with the federal funds rate smoothly
adjusted in response to cyclical movements in economic activity, deviations of inﬂation from
the inﬂation target, inﬂation target shifts, and transitory policy shocks. Unlike typical
empirical models with a single policy shock, the model in this paper includes two types of
policy shocks: permanent shifts to the inﬂation target and transitory perturbations of the
federal funds rate. Because agents do not observe the true target, they cannot distinguish
permanent and transitory policy shocks in the short run.
3In the model, the inﬂation goal of policy is assumed only to be known by the monetary
authority, although the observable policy instrument provides noisy information about the
target. Private sector agents must form perceptions of the inﬂation goal of policy and these
perceptions inﬂuence nominal price setting. The model speciﬁcation admits a possibly
shifting inﬂation target of monetary policy as well as a perceived inﬂation target that also
may vary over time. This framework can apply to countries with announced inﬂation targets
as well as to those without, since announced targets may not be fully credible.
Simulations of the model illustrate how imperfect policy credibility can aﬀect transition
t oan e wi n ﬂation target, a question that cannot be addressed by many commonly used
empirical and theoretical models. In contrast to models where all monetary policy actions
are transient, the model generates sizable monetary policy contributions to historical
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and bond yields attributable to permanent target shocks. A
consequence of the estimated learning structure is that the perceived inﬂation target remains
elevated well into the 1980s, holding up bond rates long after the inﬂation target and
inﬂation have retreated.
Taylor (1980) and Meyer and Webster (1982) examine the implications of a permanent
policy shock in models with a money growth rule and learning behavior on the part of the
private sector. These papers examined the behavior of inﬂation without references to actual
or perceived inﬂation targets or long-term interest rates. Eﬀects of changes in perceived
inﬂation targets on long-term bond rates are analyzed in Fuhrer (1996), Huh and Lansing
(1998), and Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b). Whereas Fuhrer’s analysis assumes shifts
in policy regimes are instantly known to private agents, the remaining studies incorporate
asymmetric information assumptions. The current paper provides explicit contrasts between
empirical estimates of the time-varying inﬂation target and private sector perceptions of the
inﬂation target.
Following the seminal work of Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), models
4of learning by agents often specify that agent expectations are generated by recursive least
squares (RLS) estimates of linear forecast functions (perceived laws of motion). RLS
learning is a natural assumption for models that are known to have ﬁxed coeﬃcients.
However, RLS learning is likely to be less relevant for economies with time-varying structures
(including the case of shifting inﬂation targets).
Alternative learning methods for time-varying shifts include change point models,
explored by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a), and variants of bounded memory learning, such
as rolling sample estimation or constant gain estimation, illustrated in the simulations
of Orphanides and Williams (2003). Other examples of constant gain learning in the
context of rare permanent real shocks are Bullard and Duﬀy (2003) and Bullard and Eusepi
(2003). As noted in these studies, beneﬁts of constant gain learning include both recursive
tractability and sensitivity to recent observations that incorporate the current shifts of the
underlying economic structure. Although bounded memory learning can converge to a
rational expectations equilibrium in a deterministic model, convergence will not occur in
models with stochastic shocks, Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Consequently, an oﬀsetting
cost of constant gain learning, even if shifts are infrequent, is that the economy will not
converge to the new rational expectations equilibrium path but to an ergodic distribution
about the REE. Intuitively, smaller rolling sample spans or larger constant gains provide
at r a d e o ﬀ between faster recognition of new shifts and higher “excess” volatility in steady
states.
In this paper, implications for the transmission mechanism of possibly shifting policy
goals, imperfect policy credibility (or asymmetric information), and private sector learning
are examined by comparing the properties of two empirical models of the U.S. economy:
a model with time-varying policy goals and learning; and, a model with similar dynamic
structure but with a constant and credible inﬂation target. Many of the studies cited earlier
address asymmetric information and learning issues using analytical or calibrated models.
5By contrast, the analysis of this paper is based on an estimated empirical model with
a shifting inﬂation target. Time variation of the inﬂation target incorporates exogenous
and endogenous sources, and is not limited to a small number of policy regimes. Additional
contributions of the paper include a model speciﬁcation with both permanent and transitory
policy shocks, explicit estimation of the implicit actual and perceived inﬂation target series,
and dynamic analysis linking private sector perceptions of target shocks to the behavior of
long-term interest rates.
The next section introduces the empirical model with a time-varying inﬂation target,
asymmetric information, and learning. Section 3 discusses estimation procedures.
Estimation results are presented for both the time-varying target model and a model
that assumes the inﬂation target is constant and credible. Kalman ﬁlter estimates of
the perceived inﬂation target and the inﬂation target obtained from the time-varying
model are presented. Section 4 compares the dynamic responses of the two systems to
transitory structural shocks and explores responses to target and expectations shocks in
the time-varying target model. Three important results are obtained. First, in general,
responses in the time-varying target model tend to be smaller and less persistent than those
in the constant target model. Second, in contrast to the transitory eﬀects obtained with
the constant-target model, aggregate supply shocks have permanent eﬀects on inﬂation and
nominal interest rates in the time-varying-target model as a consequence of partial policy
accommodation of supply shocks. Third, the “price puzzle” in the response of inﬂation to
a transitory policy shock disappears in the model with a time-varying target and learning.
Section 5 explores the role of the speed of learning in the time-varying target model. The
speed of learning is shown to inﬂuence the volatility and persistence of responses to policy
shocks. As the speed of learning increases, i.e., with an improvement in credibility, real costs
associated with the transition to a new inﬂation regime are smaller. However, faster learning
also implies greater volatility in inﬂation target perceptions in response to transitory policy
6shocks.
2 The model
As demonstrated in Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), shifts in the perceived inﬂation target,
imperfect policy credibility, and time-variation in the persistence of inﬂation appear to be
important empirical properties of U.S. inﬂation. The motivation of the current paper is to
specify a simple dynamic macro model that can generate these key empirical features.
Two issues inﬂuenced the selection of a model with essentially a VAR-like structure.
First, good empirical ﬁt was seen as essential to providing a realistic assessment of the
economic signiﬁcance of shifting inﬂation targets and asymmetric information. Second,
replication of observed dynamic interactions is important for examining policy transmission
and long-run forecasts.
The selected speciﬁcation is a bit more general than a standard VAR. As with traditional
models, dynamic interactions among deviations of variables from their natural rates are
captured in a linear time-series structure. However, whereas standard models implicitly
assume that the natural rates of variables are constant and known, the current model is
augmented to allow for shifts of the inﬂation target and asymmetric policy information.2
Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) estimated a perceived inﬂation target series from a similar
VAR-like model with shifting endpoints, but did not distinguish between target shifts and
perceived target shifts.
The asymmetric information assumption implies that the inﬂation target is not known
by the private sector.3 E v e ni ft h et a r g e tw e r et ob ea n n o u n c e d ,t h em o d e la s s u m e st h a t
2The term “natural rate” is used to refer to the long-run equilibrium or attractor of a variable. The
term “anchor” appears to be traditionally used in literature to denote a nominal natural rate, and the terms
“steady-state” and “mean” often imply constants.
3The source of asymmetric information in this study is lack of knowledge on the part of the private
sector about the level and evolution of the inﬂation target, and about transitory and permanent policy
shocks. Other formulations of asymmetric information include private sector uncertainty about policymaker
preferences over real activity versus inﬂa t i o na si nC u k i e r m a na n dM e l t z e r( 1 9 8 6 )a n dT e t l o wa n dv o nz u r
Muehlen (2001), and diﬀerent models of the transmission mechanism or other aspects of model speciﬁcation
7such announcements need not be credible. Consequently, the private sector must form
beliefs about the inﬂation target. The model is augmented to capture learning behavior on
the part of the private sector and includes a time-varying perceived inﬂation target that
will tend to diﬀer from the possibly time-varying inﬂation target.
The model includes expressions for the dynamics of four variables, the output gap (yt),
inﬂation (πt), the federal funds rate (rt), and a long-term interest rate (Rt), and expressions
that describe the evolution of time-variation, if any, in natural rates. A long-term interest
rate has been included so that policy transmission issues associated with long-horizon
expectations can be better addressed. In particular, long-term interest rates depend on
private sector long-horizon forecasts of inﬂation, and those forecasts will be inﬂuenced in
the short-run by shifts in the perceived inﬂation target.
In model expressions, variables are expressed as deviations from natural rates. The
natural rate of the output gap is assumed to be constant (¯ y) and equal to zero, although
empirical estimates may diﬀer from zero over ﬁnite samples. The natural rate of inﬂation
equals the perceived inﬂation target (πP(t) ) ,w h i c hm a yb et i m ev a r y i n g . T h en a t u r a l
real rate is assumed to be constant (¯ r). The perceived inﬂation target, πP(t), appears in
the natural rates of both short-term and long-term nominal interest rates as it anchors
the expected inﬂation component of nominal interest rates. Thus, the natural rate of the
long-term nominal interest rate is equal to the sum of the natural real rate, the term
premium natural rate (¯ θ) which is assumed to be constant, and the perceived inﬂation
target: ¯ r + ¯ θ + πP(t). The natural rate of the federal funds rate is the sum of the natural
real rate and the perceived inﬂation target (¯ r + πP(t)). The policy equation also captures
the federal funds rate response to the deviation of recent inﬂation from the policy target
for inﬂation.
Expressions for the output gap, inﬂation, and the long-term interest rate are similar
employed by the private sector and policymakers.
8to VAR equations with lags of the output gap, inﬂation, the federal funds rate, and the
long-term interest rate included in each. Monetary policy is modeled using an estimated
Taylor (1993) rule with smoothing. Smoothing refers to the appearance of the lagged
funds rate in the policy rule. The lagged funds rate is often interpreted as capturing
smoothing behavior on the part of policymakers who may prefer to act gradually in the
presence of uncertainties about the structure of the economy. Gradualism may also reduce
ﬁnancial market activity and increase economic responses to policy actions by magnifying
the response of other market interest rates to policy actions. See, for example, the discussion
in Amato and Laubach (1999) and English, Nelson, and Sack (2003). Empirical estimates of
Taylor rules with smoothing are provided in Kozicki (1999) and Sack and Wieland (2000).
T h ep o l i c yr u l es p e c i ﬁes that the deviation of the federal funds rate from its natural rate
is determined by policy responses to the output gap, the deviation of inﬂation over the
previous four quarters (¯ πt,4)f r o mt h ei n ﬂation target, a lagged funds rate deviation to
capture policy smoothing, and a transitory policy shock (ur,t):
rt =¯ r + πP(t)+γy(yt − ¯ y)+γπ(¯ πt,4 − πT(t)) + ρ(rt−1 − ¯ r − πP(t)) + ur,t (1)
where ¯ πt,4 ≡
P3
i=0 πt−i.
Structural shocks to aggregate demand, aggregate supply, the funds rate (a transient
policy shock), and the term premium are identiﬁed by assuming a recursive causal ordering
with the output gap ordered ﬁrst, followed by inﬂation, the federal funds rate, and the
long-term interest rate. Thus, the assumed causal ordering implies that long-term interest
rates respond contemporaneously to the aggregate demand, aggregate supply, transitory
policy, and term premium shocks. The residual in the output gap equation is identiﬁed as
an aggregate demand shock.
The inﬂation equation is a reduced-form Phillips curve. Inﬂation may respond
contemporaneously to the aggregate demand shock, explaining a possible correlation
9between the output gap equation residual and the inﬂation equation residual. Inﬂation
also responds to an aggregate supply (cost push) shock. A notable feature of the reduced
form Phillips curve speciﬁcation is that the sum of coeﬃcients on lags of inﬂation deviations
are not constrained to unity. However, because inﬂation only appears in the Phillips curve as
the deviation from the perceived target, the expression does not exhibit a long-run tradeoﬀ
between inﬂation and the output gap.
A long-run tradeoﬀ is absent because the policy rule in the model is such that positive
excess demand can persist only if the inﬂation target is allowed to increase. The learning
structure in the model is such that an increase in the target is eventually incorporated
into an increase in the perceived target, and consequently to inﬂation.4 The policy rule
structure assumes that monetary policy responds contemporaneously to the output gap
and inﬂation, and thus to the aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. The funds
rate also responds to the transitory policy shock (a liquidity supply shock).
The remaining equations of the model describe the evolution of the inﬂation target
series and the perceived target series. The inﬂation target follows a martingale process so
that changes in the inﬂation target series are not forecastable. The inﬂation target shifts
with policy accommodation (if any) of aggregate supply shocks (uS,t), with deterministic
regime change (in the early years of Volker’s chairmanship of the Federal Reserve), or with
exogenous permanent policy shocks (uT,t):
πT(t +1 )=πT(t)+ηd79−82 + cSTuS,t + uT,t. (2)
Regime change to bring inﬂation down following the appointment of Volker as chairman of
the Federal Reserve is captured deterministically through the dummy variable d79−82,s e t
to one for the period 1979Q4 through 1982Q4 and zero at other times. As captured by
4Given the structure of the model, the monetary authority would be able to maintain permanent excess
demand (i.e., output above potential) by allowing the inﬂation target and inﬂation to continue to increase
without bound.
10the binary dummy, the inﬂation target was gradually changed by η in each quarter of the
1979Q4 through 1982Q4 interval. A competing description is that the target was completely
adjusted in one quarter, 1979Q4, but this provides a poor estimate of η. Increasing the
period over which the target change occurred reduces the standard error of the estimate
of η. The 1979Q4 to 1982Q4 interval is also a period when U.S. monetary policy targeted
measures of the money supply and nonborrowed reserves, and there were several adjustments
of targets and operating procedures.
Exogenous policy shocks may proxy for changes in the degree of conservatism of the
F e d e r a lO p e nM a r k e tC o m m i t t e e( F O M C ) ,a tl e a s tt ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h i sa c c o m p a n i e sa
change in the composition of the FOMC, and importantly, the Chairman. Other possible
explanations for target changes include partial accommodation of changing expectations of
the private sector, as in Bullard and Cho (2002), or partial accommodation of movements
in inﬂation, as in G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003). The former is inconsistent with
the target leading the perceived target, as was likely the case in the Volker disinﬂation.
The latter might be seen as a reduced-form variant of partial accommodation of aggregate
supply shocks as speciﬁed in this paper.
The evolution of the perceived inﬂation target incorporates learning behavior about
the target on the part of the private sector. Several approaches to modeling learning
behavior that could be used to close the model include recursive least squares learning,
Markov switching, changepoint learning, and constant gain learning. In models with a ﬁxed
structure, recursive least squares estimates of parameters can converge to the true parameter
values. However, recursive least squares loses its appeal in models with structural change
as distant past observations are weighted equally to recent observations. Markov switching
models are eﬀective in speciﬁcations where there is advance knowledge of the number of
regimes. However, empirical implementations do not accommodate regimes that have not
yet occurred (with no data points in a regime, it is impossible to estimate the parameters
11that characterize the regime).
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a and 2001b) use changepoint learning in a model with possibly
multiple regimes when the number of regimes is not predetermined. Learning about target
shifts is modeled by assuming agents use Andrews (1993) breakpoint tests to detect mean
shifts in inﬂation. Learning lags are captured by dating expectations shifts according to
the time at which agents could statistically detect mean shifts, which necessarily lags the
actual occurrence of mean shifts. Heterogeneity of agents is captured using alternative
implementations of the test based on the number of new observations collected prior to
retesting. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) use multinominal logit aggregation of heterogeneous
learning that allows weights on diﬀerent breakpoint-test implementations to depend on
recent performance. An advantage of changepoint learning is that it will converge in the
absence of structural shifts. A disadvantage is that testing for change points is not amenable
to recursive formulations.
Constant gain learning is similar to recursive least squares but gives more weight
to more recent observations to capture eﬀects of structural shifts. However, in the
absence of shifts, constant gain learning will generate noisy estimates of parameters
(natural rates) as disturbances to observable data series will be mapped into perceptions.
Although changepoint learning and constant gain learning have very diﬀerent properties,
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) found that inﬂation-based constant gain learning in which
the perceived target is updated in the direction of recent inﬂation (πP(t +1 )=πP(t)+
κ(πt − πP(t))) approximated the estimated perceived inﬂation target constructed using
changepoint-learning with heterogeneous agents.
This paper uses constant gain updating rules to model learning about structural shifts
in the inﬂation target. The beneﬁts of this approach include the potential for capturing
permanent structural shifts, the adaptability to recursive formulations, and the absence of
sharp prior requirements, such as advance knowledge of the number of policy regimes. The
12principal cost is the excess noise in estimated perceptions that occurs in the absence of
structural shifts.
The constant-gain learning algorithm that was chosen diﬀers from the inﬂation-based
algorithm examined in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b). Implicitly, inﬂation-based constant
gain learning assumes considerable ignorance on the part of the private sector about the
economic structure and requires policy actions to ﬁrst inﬂuence aggregate demand, which
in turn aﬀects inﬂation, before the perceived target adjusts. However, additional lags in the
learning process are by assumption. Given the structure of the model in the current paper,
learning is based on unexpected movements in the funds rate as these are direct, but noisy,
measurements of shifts in the inﬂation target. A funds rate that is higher than expected
may reﬂect a permanent reduction in the inﬂation target or a transient positive policy
shock to the funds rate, and vice versa. With policy response-based learning, movements
in the perceived target may (but need not) lead inﬂation. By contrast, with inﬂation-based
constant gain learning, inﬂation necessarily leads the perceived target. Eﬀects of shocks
will dissipate more slowly because inﬂation aﬀects the perceived target and shifts in the
perceived target feed back into inﬂation.
To isolate the eﬀects of imperfect policy credibility, private sector agents are assumed
to know the structure and parameters of the economy with the exception of the level and
evolution of the inﬂation target and the transitory policy shock, ur,t. Since they know the
general form of the policy rule—including policy response coeﬃcients to the output gap,
γy,t oi n ﬂation deviations, γπ, and to the policy smoothing parameter, ρ—the deviation of
the federal funds rate, rt, from private sector expectations of the federal funds rate, re
t,
provides noisy information on the deviation of the perceived target, πP(t), from the true
target, πT(t),
rt − re
t = γπ(πP(t) − πT(t)) + ur,t. (3)
Private sector learning about the target is modeled by assuming agents use a perpetual
13learning algorithm that places greater weight on more recent observations of the funds rate
expectations error:
πP(t +1 )=πP(t) − δ(rt − re
t)+uP,t, (4)
where uP,t is an expectations shock. After substituting for the funds rate expectations error
from (3), perceived target learning satisﬁes:
πP(t +1 )=( 1− δγπ)πP(t)+δγππT(t) − δur,t + uP,t. (5)
For non-zero δ, the target and perceived target are cointegrated, so that for 0 <δ γ π < 1
and in the absence of future shocks, the perceived target will gradually adjust towards
the target.5 This adjustment comes, not from direct knowledge of the target, but from
information about the gap between the target and perceived target that is contained in the
market prediction error for the funds rate.
3E s t i m a t i o n R e s u l t s
Quarterly data from 1960 through 2001 was used for the empirical analysis. Inﬂation
is measured as the quarterly percent change in the chain-price index for core personal
consumption expenditures. The output gap is measured as the percent deviation between
quarterly real GDP and Congressional Budget Oﬃce estimates of quarterly potential real
GDP. The vintage of these data is the ﬁrst quarter of 2003. The quarterly averages of the
federal funds rate and of the constant maturity 10-year yield on U.S. Treasury bonds are
used as the short-term policy rate and the long-term interest rate, respectively. All series
are expressed at annual rates. The output and inﬂation series are seasonally adjusted.
The model to be estimated includes:
5However, as long as monetary policy is subject to transitory shocks, the perceived target will continue
to ﬂu c t u a t ea b o u tt h et r u et a r g e t .
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,
where Et−1yt and Et−1πt (the latter enters through Et−1¯ πt,4) are conditional expectations
formed from the output gap and inﬂation equations, and uD, uS, uτ, ur, uT,a n d
uP are serially uncorrelated and mutually uncorrelated structural shocks to aggregate
demand, aggregate supply, the term premium, monetary policy (transitory), monetary
policy (permanent), and expectations. These structural shocks are assumed to be Normally
d i s t r i b u t e dw i t hm e a nz e r oa n dv a r i a n c eσ2
i for i = D,S,τ,r,T,P. The lag polynomial β(L)
allows for four lags. The inﬂation target of policy and the perceived target are unobserved
variables to be jointly estimated with the rest of the model. The model is estimated using
maximum likelihood with Kalman ﬁlters used to extract the time-varying paths of the
inﬂation target and the perceived inﬂation target. The target and perceived target are
initialized using a diﬀuse prior.
Coeﬃcients of the matrix lag polynomial are assumed to be constant over the entire
sample. A consequence of this assumption is that any structural breaks will be mapped
15into either shifts in the inﬂation target or shifts in the perceived target. This approach
c o n t r a s t sw i t ht h a ti nC l a r i d a ,G a l i ,a n dG ertler (1998), where it is assumed the inﬂation
target is ﬁxed over a post-1979 sample. They captured structural breaks in the policy
function by estimating two policy functions: one for the period ending in 1979 and one for
the period since 1979. While policy function parameters diﬀered across subsamples, they
w e r ea s s u m e dt ob ec o n s t a n tw i t h i ne a c hs u b s a m p l e .C l a r i d a ,G a l i ,a n dG e r t l e rc o n c l u d e d
that the inﬂation target has been constant, and roughly equal to 4 percent, since 1979.
To assess the implications of possibly shifting targets and imperfect policy credibility on
model dynamics, a comparison model with a constant known target was estimated. This
“constant” model is closer in structure to a typical VAR and includes the four observable
model variables: the output gap, inﬂation, the federal funds rate, and a long-term interest
rate. However, as in the time-varying target model, the funds rate equation has been
replaced by a Taylor rule with smoothing. Structural shocks to aggregate demand, aggregate
supply, monetary policy, and the term premium are identiﬁed using the same causal ordering
as in the model that allowed time variation in the target and perceived target. The
“constant” model was estimated using a generalized version of the seemingly unrelated
regressors methodology to account for cross-equation restrictions and correlations between
equation residuals. Estimates of the coeﬃcients that summarize the structural relationships
between the residuals and estimates of the standard errors of the structural shocks are
obtained using a Cholesky decomposition of the estimated residual covariance matrix.
Estimation results for both the time-varying target model and the constant target
model are provided in Tables 1-3. The model speciﬁcations are similar in many ways.
In both models the natural rate of the output gap is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the
equilibrium real rate is close to 3 percent and the term premium natural rate is close to 0.7
percent (Table 1). In addition, estimates of parameters that identify structural shocks (c..)
that are common to the two models, and estimates of standard errors of aggregate demand
16shocks, aggregate supply shocks and term premium shocks are similar.
The main diﬀerence between the policy rules in the two models is the estimated degree
of policy smoothing. In both models, the long-run response of policy to the output gap
and inﬂation is larger than the original Taylor rule response of 0.5. However, the estimate
of the policy smoothing parameter is 0.62 in the time-varying model, similar to estimates
obtained by English, Nelson, and Sack (2003), and considerably lower than the estimate of
0.91 obtained for the constant model. Estimates of transitory policy shocks are somewhat
smaller in the time-varying target model than in the constant target model, suggesting that
time-variation in the target and the funds rate natural rate explains some of the variation in
the funds rate. Replacing the time-varying target and perceived target series, the constant
model has a constant and credible inﬂation target, ¯ π, estimated to be 4 percent.
Some of the persistence of inﬂation and nominal interest rates in the constant model is
absorbed by low frequency ﬂuctuations of the perceived inﬂation target in the natural rates
of the time-varying model. Comparing estimates of coeﬃcients in β(L) in the time-varying
model in Table 2 to those for the constant model in Table 3, reveals that the sum of
coeﬃcients on own lags is considerably lower in the time-varying model. The sum of
coeﬃcients on lags of long-term interest rates in the long rate equation is 0.66, in the
time-varying model and 0.78 in the constant model; The sum of coeﬃcients on lags of
inﬂation in the inﬂation equation is 0.53 in the time-varying model and 0.94 in the constant
model. The next section will show that estimates of lower persistence of devatiations of
economic variables from their natural rates in the time-varying model will show up as less
persistent impulse functions.
The lower sum of coeﬃcients in the time-varying target model in conjunction with
the low frequency movements in the estimated perceived target series may help explain
time-variation in the persistence of inﬂation as found by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and
Cogley and Sargent (2003). In particular, the persistence of inﬂation incorporates the degree
17of persistence of inﬂation deviations as well as persistence in movements of the perceived
inﬂation target. Thus, in small samples, estimates of persistence will tend to be close to the
persistence of inﬂation deviations during periods when ﬂuctuations in the perceived inﬂation
target are small, such as 1986-1994, or 1997-2001. However, in periods with large movements
in the perceived inﬂation target, such as 1966-1982, estimates of inﬂation persistence will
be larger as they will be inﬂuenced by low frequency movements in the perceived inﬂation
target.
The estimated transition equation for the implicit target found signiﬁcant evidence of
partial accommodation of supply shocks on the part of policymakers. The estimate of cST
implies that on average about 3/4 of each supply shock was accommodated by policy. It
should be noted that this estimate implies accommodation of adverse supply shocks such
as higher oil or import prices and negative productivity shocks that would tend to raise
inﬂation, as well as of supply shocks that would tend to lower inﬂation.
As expected, coeﬃcient estimates of the Volker regime change parameter η are negative
and imply that the implicit target was reduced by 4.5 percentage points between 1979Q4
and 1982Q4. The coeﬃcient estimate is insigniﬁcant, but based on only a few observations.
The variance of exogenous permanent target shocks and the variance of expectations shocks
were constrained to be equal. In the absence of this restriction, the standard errors of these
parameter estimates were large. The restricted estimates imply that exogenous target shocks
and exogenous expectations shocks tend to be relative small, with a standard deviation of
σT = σP =0 .21.
The estimated learning parameter, δ,i ss i g n i ﬁcant and implies that 8 percent of policy
forecast errors are mapped into perceived target shifts. With an estimated policy response
to inﬂa t i o no f0 . 5 3 ,r o u g h l y4p e r c e n to ft h eg a pb e t w e e nt h et a r g e ta n dp e r c e i v e dt a r g e t
is closed each quarter. This relatively slow learning rate implies lengthy lags between
movements of the inﬂation target and the perceived target.
18The estimated actual and perceived target series exhibit considerable time variation
and the diﬀerence between the two series can be sizable. In Figure 1, the estimates of
the target and perceived target are predictions conditional on data through the previous
period, but given estimates of model parameters based on the full sample. Movements in
the estimated target reﬂect the direct contribution of permanent policy shocks to inﬂation
variability. Thus, the ﬁgure suggests that permanent policy shocks that led to shifts in the
implicit inﬂation target contributed importantly to ﬂuctuations in the perceived target and
inﬂation. This is a diﬀerent view than Orphanides and Williams (2003) who assume that
all variation in perceived target shifts is due to learning behavior. The sizable diﬀerences
between movements in the actual target and the perceived target provide evidence that
imperfect credibility associated with learning is also an important factor explaining time
v a r i a t i o ni nt h ep e r c e i v e dt a r g e ta n di n ﬂation. Learning behavior introduces recognition
lags so that movements of the perceived target lag those in the target series.
Also included in Figure 1 is a line reﬂecting the estimate of the constant target from
the constant model. At 4 percent, the estimated constant target seems high for the recent
period, while values of the estimated time-varying target are plausible. Describing his
preference for an inﬂation target range, Governor Gramlich (2003) recently commented
that he “would personally set the bottom of the range at slightly above 1 percent per year
for the core PCE deﬂator, ... and ... the top of the range at about 2.5 percent per year. The
midpoint of this range is then slightly less than 2 percent per year, which turns out to be
a b o u tw h a tU . S .c o r eP C Ei n ﬂation has averaged over the past eight years.” The inﬂation
goal of U.S. monetary policy is usually described as “price stability,” Governor Bernanke
(2003) provided his view of this concept, noting: “Inﬂation breached the 2 percent barrier
in the spring of 1996 and has remained consistently within the narrow range of 1.5 to 2
percent for the past six and a half years—for practical purposes, a good approximation to
price stability.”
19Estimates of the target series, the real federal funds rate, and inﬂation are shown in
Figure 2. The implicit target follows the same general low frequency movements observed
in inﬂation and is similar to the “core” inﬂation series estimated by Cogley and Sargent
(2003) and to the probability of a high inﬂation regime under asymmetric information
in Schorfheide (2003).6 As would be expected, movements in the target generally lead
movements in inﬂation. One exception to this leading property is the rapid rise in inﬂation
in the mid-1970 that followed the ﬁrst oil price shock. One interpretation is that the large
increase in inﬂation at that time was a consequence of a negative supply shock and not due
to a change in the inﬂation target. The subsequent increase in the estimated implicit target
may then be interpreted as partial accommodation of the eﬀects of the supply shock on
inﬂation due to a reluctance on the part of the central bank to tighten policy as necessary
to reverse this increase. This view is consistent with Bernanke (2003) who commented
that “without Fed accommodation, higher oil prices abroad would not have translated into
domestic inﬂation to any signiﬁcant degree.”
Also apparent in Figure 2 is a strong negative relationship between the real funds rate
and the estimated implicit target. During the 1960s, the real funds rate ﬂuctuated around
about 2 percent and the estimated target inched upward. The target rose more rapidly
in the late 1960s with the fall in the real funds rate. Subsequently, the negative real rates
observed in the mid to late 1970s suggest that the Fed may have been willing to accept higher
inﬂation. This policy shows up as a relatively high implicit inﬂation target. The policy was
rapidly reversed with the Volker tightening. In the early 1980s a sizable reduction in the
estimated implicit target is accompanied by a rapid rise in the real funds rate. Although
the implicit target remained close to 4 percent through the “credit crunch” of the early
1990s, it has since fallen further.
6The probability of a high inﬂation regime under asymmetric information in Schorfheide (2003) increases
somewhat later than the rise in the core inﬂation series of Cogley and Sargent (2003) and the increase in
the inﬂation target estimated in the current paper.
20Estimates of the perceived inﬂa t i o nt a r g e ts e r i e sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e3w i t hi n ﬂation
and long-term inﬂation expectations data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
M o v e m e n t si nt h ep e r c e i v e dt a r g e tt e n dt ol a gi n ﬂation, but track survey data on long-term
inﬂation expectations quite well. The survey evidence provides independent support for
the timing of movements in the perceived inﬂation target. Some diﬀerences between the
perceived target series and the long-term inﬂation expectations series are to be expected.
The long-term inﬂation expectations series is from a survey of expectations of inﬂation
over the next 10 years while the perceived target is a limit of expectations. Also, the
inﬂation series and estimated perceived target series are for inﬂa t i o nr a t e sb a s e do nt h e
chain price index for core personal consumption expenditures, while the long-term inﬂation
expectations series is for inﬂa t i o nr a t e sb a s e do nt h ec o n s u m e rp r i c ei n d e x .
A notable feature of the estimated perceived target series is that the perceived target
remains above inﬂation for much of the early- to mid-1980s and also in the 1990s. One
interpretation is that in October 1979, when the FOMC undertook a change in policy
to lower inﬂation, the private sector did not immediately see the new policy as fully
credible. The perceived inﬂation target and long-term interest rates remained elevated
despite declines in inﬂation in the early to mid 1980s. Only as policy was set to keep
inﬂation low, did the perceived inﬂation target gradually recede towards the actual inﬂation
rate.
The behavior of the estimated perceived inﬂation target in the 1980s may provide new
insight on a debate between empirical and theoretical macroeconomic research. Theoretical
macro models generally assume rational forward-looking behavior. By contrast, empirical
researchers often opt for backward-looking assumptions in order to explain empirical
regularities (Rudebusch (1998)). Comparing the estimated perceived target to inﬂation
suggests an alternative view. In particular, if movements in the perceived inﬂation target
lag movements in actual inﬂation, then rational forward-looking behavior on the part of
21agents may be misperceived as backward looking behavior. The lag may not be due to
“irrationality” but to asymmetric information on the part of market participants and the
Federal Reserve.
The model decomposes ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and long-term rates into components
due to natural rate movements and to transitory variation. As discussed earlier, in the
time-varying target model, both permanent policy shocks and eﬀects of learning associated
with imperfect policy credibility contributed importantly to ﬂuctuations in the perceived
inﬂation target and inﬂation. Unlike the constant target model, natural rate movements
in the time-varying target model also contribute importantly to ﬂuctuations in long-term
interest rates (Figure 4). Since the natural real rate and the term premium natural rate
are both assumed to be constant, all the variation in the long-rate natural rate comes
from variation in the perceived inﬂation target. Fluctuations in the long-rate natural
rate are related to the level factor in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b), Dewachter and Lyrio
(2002), H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2002) and Rudebusch and Wu (2003). Although
quarter-to-quarter ﬂuctuations in the natural rate are generally the same or smaller than
those in long rate deviations, low frequency ﬂuctuations involve swings that are as large.
The main point to take from this chart is that variation in natural rates appears to be
as important in contributing to historical movements in long rates as transitory variations
around natural rates.
4M o d e l D y n a m i c s
This section compares the dynamic properties of the time-varying target model to those of
the constant-target model. The time-varying target model is used also to investigate the
transition to a new inﬂation rate following a permanent policy shock to the inﬂation target
and to examine behavior following an expectations shock, i.e., a shock to the perceived
target.
22The two models have similar qualitative responses to aggregate demand shocks,
transitory policy shocks and term premium shocks, but responses to the former two shocks
tend to be more persistent and larger in the constant target model. However, model
responses to aggregate supply shocks are considerably diﬀerent as aggregate supply shocks
lead to target shifts in the time-varying model. Figures 5 through 8 show responses of the
two models to an aggregate demand shock, an aggregate supply (or cost push) shock, a
term premium shock, and a transitory policy shock, respectively. Responses for the model
with time-varying targets and asymmetric information are shown as the solid line in the
Figures and labeled time-varying. The short dashed lines labeled constant show responses
for the model with a known constant inﬂation target.
In response to a positive aggregate demand shock (Figure 5), the output gap, the
long-term interest rate and the funds rate increase immediately. Inﬂation increases
substantially in the constant model, but remains under control in the the time-varying
model. The muted response of inﬂation in the time-varying model may reﬂe c tt h a tw i t h
lags in inﬂation, policy can eﬀectively cut oﬀ the adverse consequences of an aggregate
demand shock before inﬂation responds. Furthermore, because policy actions are fully
anticipated in the time-varying model, long-term inﬂation expectations are ﬁrmly anchored
by a perceived inﬂation target that does shift with the demand shock. Because of the larger
inﬂation response, the policy response is much more prolonged in the constant model and
long-term interest rates remain elevated for a considerable period of time. In both models
tighter monetary policy successfully slows output. In the long run, all variables return to
their initial levels.
A positive aggregate supply shock (Figure 6) leads to an immediate increase in inﬂation.
Responses to the shock diﬀer considerably in the two models, however. In the constant
model, the aggregate supply shock leads to an output contraction. The federal funds rate
increases as the response to higher inﬂation dominates the response to weaker economic
23activity. In the long-run, all variables return to their initial levels. In the time-varying
model, monetary policy partially accommodates the increase in inﬂation due to the supply
s h o c kb ya l l o w i n gt h ei n ﬂation target to increase. The output gap turns negative in the
near-term as a consequence of the supply shock. Policy eases to avoid the negative output
response as occurs in the model with the constant target. The easier policy reverses the
negative output eﬀect. Inﬂation, the federal funds rate, and the long-term interest rate
gradually approach a new higher level as the private sector learns about the new higher
target. The level to which they converge is 0.77 times the size of the initial shock.
Responses to term premium shocks are shown in Figure 7. This shock behaves like a
liquidity demand shock. In particular, the shock may reﬂect the implications of an increased
demand for funds on the part of producers who anticipate a future increase in sales. The
rise in long-term interest rates correctly precedes the increase in output, which also leads
to a tightening of policy. By this interpretation, the term premium shock act as a sales
expectations shock or a credit demand shock.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses to a transitory policy shock. Responses are less
persistent in the time-varying model. The higher smoothing parameter in the estimated
policy rule of the constant model leads to a more gradual reversal of the initial policy shock.
In both models, tighter monetary policy leads to weaker economic activity, followed by a
decline in inﬂation. The long-term interest rate is higher in the short run, reﬂecting the
immediate increase in the funds rate. With weaker activity and lower inﬂation, policy eases
and the long rate also declines below initial levels (again only slightly).
The response of inﬂation to a transitory policy shock exhibits a price puzzle in the
constant model, but not in the time-varying model. This is partially explained by the
downward adjustment of the perceived target in response to the policy shock. Not knowing
with certainty whether the tighter policy is due to a transitory shock or a reduction in
the inﬂation target, private sector agents put some weight on the latter possibility and the
24perceived inﬂation target moves down. In the long-run, all variables return to their initial
levels in both models. In the time-varying model, agents correctly learn that the policy
shock was only transitory.
The ﬁnal two simulations examine responses to permanent target shocks and to
expectations shocks. These experiments could only be run in the time-varying target model
because in the other model the target and perceived target are constrained to be constant.
Figure 9 reports impulse responses to a permanent target shock that increases the inﬂation
target by one percentage point. Policy immediately eases strongly, because with the increase
in the target, inﬂation is now too low. In the absence of an immediate inﬂation response,
the lower nominal funds rate implies a lower real funds rate and leads to a small decline in
long-term rates and to an expansion of output. Unexpectedly easy policy leads private sector
agents gradually to believe that the inﬂation target may be higher and the perceived inﬂation
target increases. Inﬂation increases with higher aggregate demand and the increase in the
perceived target. Initially, the increase in the perceived target leads the increase in inﬂation.
As inﬂation increases towards the target, policy becomes less expansionary. Eventually the
output gap returns to zero. However, the perceived target gradually converges towards the
new inﬂation target as does inﬂation. The long-term interest rate and the federal funds
rate also fully incorporate the permanent increase in inﬂation and converge to a level that
is one percentage point higher than initially.
Responses to a shock to the perceived target are shown in Figure 10. This expectational
shock occurs in the absence of a change in the target. Output increases initially because an
increase in the perceived target in the absence of an increase in inﬂation is like a reduction
in inﬂationary pressures which stimulates aggregate demand. Excess demand then leads to
rising inﬂation. The funds rate is increased to bring down inﬂation and higher inﬂation, and
the long rate follows suit. With tighter policy the economic activity slows, and inﬂation
declines. Tighter than expected policy leads private sector agents to revise down their
25perception of the inﬂation target. Gradually, all variables return to their pre-shock levels.
5 Impulse response tradeoﬀs associated with diﬀerent
learning rates
The estimated learning function in the time-varying target model implies very slow learning
about the target shift. In Figure 9, it takes 16 quarters for the perceived target to move
half way to the new target. To gain insight about the eﬀects of improved credibility with
faster learning, the estimated learning parameter δ =0 .079 was increased by two standard
errors to 0.157 to simulate the implications of faster learning:
πP(t +1 )=πP(t) − 0.157[rt − re
t]+uP,t. (6)
Impulse responses were recalculated assuming all other aspects of the model would be
unaﬀected.7
Responses to the transitory policy shock show how faster learning can lead to excess
volatility in steady states. Here, a steady state corresponds to a policy regime with a
constant inﬂation target. With the inﬂation target unchanged, faster learning implies that
variables return to unchanged natural rates more quickly. However, as shown in Figure 11,
with faster learning, responses to a transitory policy shock are more volatile. The higher
volatility reﬂects that the immediate response of the perceived target to the transitory
policy shock is larger under faster learning.
With faster learning, the total real eﬀects associated with transition to a new policy
regime are smaller. Figure 12 shows responses to a permanent target shock. The perceived
target adjusts halfway to the new target in 8 quarters and 3/4 of the way in 16 quarters—the
time it took to adjust halfway with the slower estimated learning parameter. Total real
eﬀe c t sc a nb em e a s u r e da st h ei n t e g r a lb e t w e e nt h ei m p u l s er e s p o n s eo ft h eo u t p u tg a pa n d
7This ceteris paribus is a simplifying assumption and may not hold in a general analysis containing a
model of endogenous learning.
26zero. For the ﬁrst 50 simulated quarters, the cumulated real output cost is 15.68 in the
response of the estimated model (also shown in Figure 9) and is 8.93 in the response of the
faster learning model.
Overall, these simulations illustrate that with faster learning, nominal variables approach
their natural rate much more rapidly, total real eﬀects of shocks are smaller, but the
volatility of responses to transitory policy shocks is larger. However, the results suggest
that excess volatility that occurs in the absence of permanent target shocks may be reduced
by allowing the learning parameter to vary over time. One approach is to assume aggregation
across heterogeneous expectations diﬀerentiated by learning speed. Time variation of
the aggregate learning parameter could reﬂect diﬀerent weightings across alternative
constant-gain learners. In the current model, target shocks, whether from accommodation
of supply shocks or from exogenous sources, are assumed to be homoskedastic. In a
more general speciﬁcation, target shocks might be viewed as heteroskedastic, either due
to heteroskedasticity in the underlying structural shocks or to a change in the parameter
governing the accommodation of aggregate supply shocks. With heteroskedastic target
shocks, a larger fraction of learners may choose to use fast learning when the size of recent
policy forecast errors increases and slow learning when the size of policy forecast errors
decreases. Such time-varying aggregation may be accomplished using multinomial logit
techniques as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) or Branch (2003).
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
This paper proposes an empirical model ﬁt to U.S. data, with permanent and transitory
policy shocks and asymmetric policy information. The model incorporates a possibly
time-varying inﬂation target and a time-varying perceived inﬂation target. The perceived
inﬂation target may diﬀer from the actual target because private agents are assumed
to not observe the true target and must learn whether movements in the federal funds
27rate are due to transitory policy shocks or to permanent policy shocks that change the
inﬂation target. Deviations between the estimated actual and perceived target provide
evidence of asymmetric information on the part of private sector agents about the inﬂation
goal of monetary policy. The results suggest that time-varying natural rates associated
with movements in the perceived inﬂation target contributed importantly to historical
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and long-term interest rates. Both permanent policy shocks and
learning associated with imperfect policy credibility explain movements in the perceived
inﬂation target.
In the perpetual learning model of the inﬂation target, the perceived inﬂation target
is adjusted to reﬂect deviations of funds rate settings from predictions conditioned on the
perceived inﬂation target. Although the estimated speed of learning is quite slow—with only
4 percent of the gap between the target and the perceived target closed per quarter—implied
model dynamics and interactions between variables appeared reasonable. Learning behavior
implies lengthy lags between movements in the actual inﬂation target and the perceived
inﬂation target. The estimated perceived inﬂation target tracks movements in long-horizon
survey expectations of inﬂation quite well. Important dynamic features of the model are
the absence of a price puzzle in the response to a transitory policy shock and permanent
nominal eﬀects of aggregate supply shocks due to partial policy accommodation. In contrast
to standard VARs, the speciﬁcation can be used to examine the dynamic responses to a
permanent change in the inﬂation target and to expectations shocks.
Finally, the paper uses simulations to show that faster learning associated with increased
credibility could shorten the transition period to a new inﬂation target, and reduce the real
eﬀects associated with such a policy change. However, faster learning also implies greater
volatility in response to transitory policy shocks.
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32Table 1: Estimation Results
Time-varying Model Constant Model
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
¯ y -0.11 0.76 -0.31 0.47
¯ r 2.99 0.74 2.79 0.46
¯ θ 0.71 0.28 0.72 0.19
γy 0.35 0.13 0.14 0.03
γπ 0.53 0.25 0.16 0.05
ρ 0.62 0.10 0.91 0.03
¯ π 4.00 0.73
δ 0.08 0.04
η -0.35 0.26
cDS -0.01 0.16 0.07
cDr 0.13
cSr 0.21
cDτ 0.19 0.10 0.18
cSτ 0.14 0.06 0.17
crτ 0.29 0.08 0.25
cST 0.77 0.34
σD 0.68 0.05 0.67
σS 0.71 0.06 0.76
σr 0.76 0.07 0.93
στ 0.34 0.03 0.36
σT = σP 0.21 0.13
The time-varying model was estimated using maximum likelihood with Kalman ﬁltering
techniques to estimate the two unobserved state variables (the inﬂation target and the
perceived inﬂation target). The constant model was estimated using a generalized version
of the seemingly unrelated regression method that allows for cross-equation restrictions
on parameters. Estimates of the coeﬃcients that summarize the structural relationships
between the residuals and estimates of the standard errors of the structural shocks are
obtained using a Cholesky decomposition of the estimated residual covariance matrix.
Estimates of the VAR slope coeﬃcients in β(L) are provided in Table 2 for the time-varying
model and in Table 3 for the constant model.
33Table 2: Estimates of β(L) for the Time-varying Model
Equation
Deviation lag Output gap Inﬂation Long rate
Variable coef S.E. coef S.E. coef S.E.
Output gap 1 1.05 0.10 -0.01 0.14 0.10 0.09
2 0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.18 -0.05 0.11
3 -0.14 0.15 -0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.10
4 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.11 -0.03 0.09
Inﬂation 1 -0.12 0.12 0.60 0.14 -0.16 0.07
2 -0.04 0.13 -0.11 0.12 0.05 0.08
3 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.09
4 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.08
Funds rate 1 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.06
2 -0.35 0.21 -0.09 0.20 0.02 0.09
3 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.08
4 -0.05 0.14 -0.01 0.14 0.03 0.07
Long Rate 1 0.02 0.28 -0.33 0.25 0.91 0.07
2 -0.06 0.34 0.37 0.33 -0.05 0.17
3 0.23 0.32 -0.14 0.38 -0.09 0.18
4 -0.13 0.25 -0.18 0.24 -0.11 0.10
34Table 3: Estimates of β(L) for the Constant Model
Equation
Deviation lag Output gap Inﬂation Long rate
Variable coef S.E. coef S.E. coef S.E.
Output gap 1 1.04 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.05
2 0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.07
3 -0.12 0.11 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.06
4 -0.01 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.05
Inﬂation 1 -0.08 0.07 0.78 0.08 -0.04 0.04
2 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.07 0.06
3 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.06
4 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.04
Funds rate 1 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.05
2 -0.35 0.10 -0.12 0.11 -0.00 0.06
3 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.06
4 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.08 -0.02 0.04
Long Rate 1 -0.00 0.15 -0.24 0.16 0.96 0.09
2 -0.04 0.20 0.28 0.23 -0.09 0.12
3 0.22 0.21 -0.13 0.24 -0.07 0.13
4 -0.13 0.14 0.09 0.16 -0.02 0.08
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Figure 4: Time-Varying Natural Rate, Constant Natural Rate,
and the Long-Term Interest Rate 
Time-varying natural rate
Long-term interest rate
Constant natural rate
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Percent
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
PercentFigure 5: Impulse Responses to an Aggregate Demand Shock
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